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Right To Share in Gas Market Under Texas
Common Purchaser Act
I.
Two distinct problems are involved in considering the Texas Common
Purchaser Act: first, the requirements for purchase that the Railroad
Commission may impose under the various sections of the act; and, second, the propriety of applying the act at all, due to possible conflict with
federal authority under the Natural Gas Act. In Railroad Comm'n v. Rio
Grande Valley Gas Co. the Texas Supreme Court drew definite conclusions
on the first problem but did not consider the second since the issue was not
presented.
The West Port Isabell Field embraces seven vertically separated reservoirs and contains three wells. One well is a quadruple completion in four
reservoirs and is owned by Rio Grande, a gas pipeline company. Its production is taken into the company's purely intrastate system which serves
the lower Rio Grande Valley. The production of a Texas Gulf Producing
Company single completion well is purchased by Rio Grande for use in
the same system. A third well, owned by Russell Maguire, is completed
in reservoirs entirely separate from the completion zones of the other two
wells.
Maguire negotiated with Rio Grande for a gas sale. The parties were
unable to reach an agreement, and Maguire applied to the Railroad Commission to force Rio Grande to purchase ratably under the Texas Common
Purchaser Act.' The Railroad Commission ordered Rio Grande to make
a 3,610 foot extension of gathering system from its own well to the Maguire well" at Rio Grande's expense, to negotiate for a gas purchase contract under compulsion of its order, and to take gas without unjust and
unreasonable discrimination as between the separate reservoirs making up
the field area. The Travis County District Court, declaring the order
invalid, enjoined its enforcement; and the Railroad Commission appealed
directly to the Texas Supreme Court. Held, reversed: All production is
"in the same field" within the scope of the Common Purchaser Act, despite the circumstance that Maguire and Rio Grande produce from dif1TEx.

REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6049a,

§§ 8, 8a, 8aa,

8a22,

8b, 8bb, 9, i, lib, lic, lid,

lldd, Ile, llf (1962 and Supp. 1966).

a Though it was not an issue in the case, it is noted that the Railroad Commission's order probably required burdening the overlying surface of the Rio Grande lease with a gathering line designed
to serve the separate Maguire lease. It is well settled that one surface owner cannot be burdened for
the benefit of minerals underlying another surface, and if a pipeline were laid without the surface
owner's permission clearly he could recover damages. Lone Star Gas Co. v, Meyer, 296 S.W. 1110
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927). See also 13 OIL & GAS INST. 385 (1962).
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ferent reservoirs;' hence, Rio Grande as a common purchaser must extend

its system at its own expense and purchase ratably from Maguire. There
is no necessity for the Commission order to determine rates and other
details of purchase as it is to be assumed these will be worked out by the
parties through the compulsory negotiations. Railroad Comin'n v. Rio
Grande Valley Gas Co., 405 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1966).
The oil segment of the Texas Common Purchaser Act was enacted in
1930,' the preamble of the act stating its purpose as "forbidding discrimination in the purchase of crude petroleum." In 1931 the legislature
extended the act by amendment to include common purchasers of natural
gas,' and the Railroad Commission was given the power to order common
purchasers of both oil and gas "to make such reasonable extensions of their
lines,' such reasonable connections and such ratable purchases as will prevent discrimination."' Under this act there are two types of common
purchasers of oil. The first is a person who is either affiliated with, or is
himself, a common carrier of oil by pipeline6 A common carrier is considered to be any person who operates a pipeline for transporting crude
petroleum to the public for hire or is engaged in the business of transporting crude petroleum by pipeline." The second type of common purchaser is
a person who operates a crude oil gathering system, whether or not he is
associated with a common carrier." Due to such comprehensive definitions
nearly anyone involved in the purchase or transportation of natural gas
is a common purchaser. Clearly there was no question that Rio Grande
was a common purchaser as defined by the act.
a The Commission's order required purchase "without unjust and unreasonable discrimination,"
which is the language of the act referring to purchase between fields; yet the court interpreted this
order under that portion of the act requiring purchase .without. discrimination" in the same field.
4
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6049a, § 8 (1962).
Every . . . common purchaser of such crude petroleum . . . shall purchase oil offered

it for purchase without discrimination in favor of one producer or person as against
another in the same field, and without unjust or unreasonable discrimination as
between fields in this state.
'TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6049a, 5 8a (1962).
[Elvery . . . [common purchaser of natural gas] . . . shall purchase, or take, such
gas under such rules or regulations as may be prescribed by the Commission, in the,.
same manner, under the same inhibitions against discriminations and subject to the
same provisions as are herein setout with respect to common purchasers of oil.
6See State v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 369 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error
ref. n.r.e., dealing with the extension of oil pipelines. There are no reported decisions squarely requiring extensions except the instant case.
1
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6049a, § lId (1962 and Supp. 1966). This section was amended in 1965 to add the following sentence: "The Commission may issue a show cause order to any
common purchaser requesting it to appear and show cause why it should not purchase the allowable
production of any producer discriminated against."
'TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6049a, § 8 (1962).
Every person, association of persons or corporation who purchases crude oil or petroleum in this state, which is affiliated through stock-ownership, common control, contract, or otherwise, with a common carrier by pipe line, as defined by law, or is
itself such common carrier, 'shall be a common purchaser . ...
'TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6018 (1962).
'°TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6049a, § 8aa (1965).
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ISSUES DECIDED BY THE COURT

The Texas Common Purchaser Act allows the Railroad Commission to
order purchases to prevent discrimination in the same field and- unjust and
unreasonable discrimination as between fields."1 "Field" generally is defined
as an area underlaid by one or more reservoirs,' though for proration
purposes in Texas the term "field" means one common reservoir." Under
the language of section 8 of the Common Purchaser Act," Rio Grande
possibly could have been forced to purchase "without unjust or unreasonable discrimination as between fields," avoiding any issue as to interpretation of "same field."" The construction of the portion of the act preventing discrimination as between fields has been the subject of litigation in only
one Texas case which resulted in a determination that the act did not
apply to the facts disclosed.'
The court in Rio Grande chose to read the term "field" in its broader
form for purposes of the Common Purchaser Act, and in this case of
first impression, interpreted "same field" as a geographical area underlaid
by one or more common reservoirs." Relying in part on a 1939 Attorney
1 See note 4 supra.
,zWILLIAM & MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 148 (1956). See also Railroad Comm'n

v. Aluminum Co. of America, 380 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1964) (ten overlying reservoirs termed a field;
however, each reservoir was considered separately for proration purposes). Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.
v. Railroad Comm'n, 335 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref. n.r.e. (two reservoirs called
a field).
"TEX.
a
REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 6049d, § 10 (1962). Pickens v. Railroad Comm'n, 387
S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1965); Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1964).
14 See note 4 supra.
'5 In fact, this may have been what the Commission order intended, see note 3 supra. There is
some question as to whether a common purchaser can be forced to purchase without unjust and
unreasonable discrimination as between fields when the purchaser makes no purchases from the
field involved. Several writers have stated that such an order would be invalid under the statute
since there could be no discrimination present. Rogers, Common Purchaser, Market Drmand, Pipeline Proration, 9 OIL & GAS INST. 48 (1958); Stayton, Proration of Gas, 14 OIL & GAS INST. 1
(1963). Stayton based his conclusion on an analogy to railroads. A railroad company cannot be
compelled to build a line to reach new territory that the carrier never agreed to serve. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co., 288 U.S. 14 (1933).
"Col-Tex Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 150 Tex. 340, 240 S.W.2d 747 (1951). The court
held that Col-Tex was not a common purchaser under a technical construction of the act and could
not be forced to purchase without unjust and unreasonable discrimination as between fields. This
decision was based on the fact that Col-Tex was not a common carrier, but only purchased by contract from a common carrier. This constructional problem was cured by amendment to S saa of
the Texas Common Purchaser Act. TEX. REV. CirV. STAT. ANN. art. 6049a, § 8aa (1962 and Supp.
1966). It would now appear that a direct purchaser would be under the requirement to purchase
without unjust and unreasonable discrimination as between fields, as well as without discrimination
in the same field.
" The necessity of this interpretation has been avoided in other states simply by statutory definition. E.g.: N.M. STAT. 65-3-29 (1965). "Pool means an underground reservoir containing
a common accumulation of crude petroleum oil or natural gas or both. Field means the general area
which is underlaid.,or appears to be underlaid by at least one pool. Field unlike pool may relate to
two or more pools."

52 OKLA. STAT. § 23

(1913)

and MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1344

(1929)

are

identical and state: - . . . shall purchase all the natural gas in the vicinity of, or which may be
reasonably reached by its pipe lines or gathering branches .... "

NOTES
General's opinion,'" the court took note that when the Common Purchaser
Act was passed, multiple well completion was unknown and attention was
focused on surface geography. As a result, the court made clear its adoption of the usual industry definition of what constitutes a field."
The supreme court stated that there was no necessity to specify rates
or details of purchase, as it would be assumed that contract terms would
be worked out by the parties. The court may be rather optimistic in assuming that terms for the contract will be agreed upon when the parties
have been unable to agree in the past. Should each party press his own advantage and disagreement continue, it would be up to the Railroad Commission to settle the dispute. As Justice Greenhill noted in his dissent, the
Railroad Commission has no authority to set prices; 2' it can only determine
the reasonableness of a price chosen by the common purchaser.2 Assuming
the Commission cannot set prices, through a series of price offers which are
unacceptable to the seller and rejected by the Commission, the effectiveness
of the act might be hampered seriously due to an indefinite succession of
administrative proceedings.
III.

POSSIBLE CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL AUTHORITY

Entirely ignored in the briefs presented to the court and, therefore, not
considered in the court's opinion is the overriding problem that in a great
majority of substantial Texas gas fields there will be at least one or more
interstate pipeline purchasers. In 1963 the Supreme Court of the United
States unqualifiedly held that the Natural Gas Act,2 passed in 1938, had
preempted the states' power to regulate the ratable take of interstate purchasers of gas."3 There can be little doubt that the act also prohibits a
state from forcing an interstate purchaser to extend its gathering facilities
to connect wells, 4 for this would directly affect interstate rates which
are under the sole control of the Federal Power Commission. Additionally,
8 1 Cps. TEx. ATT'Y GEN. 294, No. 0-1103 (1939). "It is our opinion that a producer in a
general area served by a common purchaser can force prorata purchase of oil by tendering same to
a common purchaser." It should be noted that this opinion dealt with oil pipelines, never mentioned
multiple reservoirs, and relied on the term "general area."
"9See note 12 stpra.
"0 In regard to fixing prices for a gas purchase contract with a public utility, it has been held
that, "The 'power of the Railroad Commission to fix the price of gas is not to be taken as conferred
by implication, but such power must be conferred under statutory or constitutional language that
is free from doubt and admits of no other reasonable construction." Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 133 Tex. 330, 128 S.W.2d 9 (1939).
31 The majority opinion did not state that such authority existed, but rather that the case could
be decided without regard to this potential problem.
"Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (1938).
" Northern Natural.Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
" It has already been held that it is unconstitutional for a state to regulate, burden or interfere
with interstate commerce by requiring a company transporting oil or natural gas through pipelines
in interstate commerce to extend its pipe lines across a state line into another state, Fidelity Title &
Trust Co. v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 219 Fed. 614 (D. Kan. 1913).
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it has been held with regard to interstate purchasers that the states can
impose no price terms.' The gravamen in this superseding federal power
is that, laid against the realities of Texas gas production, there are few
purely intrastate situations available to state regulation. Yet the Texas
common purchaser scheme as passed plainly was premised on jurisdiction
of all purchasers"6 and can be equitable and practical only so long as that
underlying premise is available to the Railroad Commission. When the
Texas Common Purchaser Act was amended in 1931, the Railroad Commission had control over the activities of all persons dealing with natural
gas. Since 1963, as to ordering ratable taking by an interstate pipeline,
the Texas Common Purchaser Act necessarily is invalid to that extent."
Perhaps as much as ninety per cent of the jurisdictional base upon which
it was enacted has been removed from state control.29 Certainly the legislature never intended its statute to apply in the manner it now must apply.
IV. CONCLUSION

Laid against the realities of the natural gas business, Rio Grande should
not be accepted at face value. Had only multiple intrastate purchasers
been involved, there would have been serious added complications."
Worse, if one or more purchasing pipelines in the field were interstate
lines which could not be regulated, or if there were interstate purchasers
in another field, close enough to be within the "as between fields" language
of the act, the Common Purchaser Act would seem to be rendered ineffectual to accomplish its intended purpose. The burden of purchasing
without discrimination should not be borne by, nor can it be intelligently
cast upon, the intrastate purchasers only.
It has been said that courts are not at liberty to disregard, dispense
with, or refuse to enforce a statute on the ground that conditions or circumstances have so changed that the object, reason, or policy for it has
ceased." But here, though the conditions and underlying reasons for pass2 Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Corporation Comhm'n, 355 U.S. 391 (1958); Natural Gas Pipeline Co.
v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955).
2" The preamble of the original act described its function as "vesting in the Railroad Commission
of Texas jurisdiction to authorize and require common carriers by pipeline to extend and enlarge
their respective facilities."
27See text accompanying note 23 supra.
2 At the time the Texas Common Purchaser Act was passed in 1930 and even when the Natural
Gas Act was passed in 1938, it was thought that the regulation of oil and gas was exclusively in
state control. It was not until the commerce clause revolution of the 1940's, characterized by Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), that the intervention of federal authority into the area of
state control was apparent. For a discussion of this extension of the commerce clause, see Flittie &
Armour, The Natural Gas Act Experience-A Study in Regulatory Aggression and Congressional
Failure To Control the Legislative Process, 19 Sw. L.J. 448, 454 (1965).
29 Some of the problems involved in control would be: the determination of ratable take in the
reservoir with other purchasers present; the setting of prices for the imposed gas purchase contracts,
see note 20 supra, and accompanying text, the difference of quantity and quality of gas in the various
reservoirs making up the field.
a Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., 195 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).

